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Abstract The twofold aim of this article is to model the .structure of the
Norwegian food farming industry for trout and salmon and to provide estimates for
the scale elasticity and substitution possibilities. A translog functional form of the
long run cost function is specified and estimated. The empirical findings indicate
that both capiial-labor and capital-feed inpur combinations are substitutes.
However, the labor-feed relationship is ambiguous: these inputs could he both
complements and substitutes. Scale economies existed in the indu.ttry in J982-19S3
in the .lense that the homogeneous version of the cost function shows statistically
increasing returns to scale. However, il can be noted thai the measure of the cost
efficiency of large farms compared to small farms probably incorporates the
combined effect of regulation of the industry and scale economies. Tlw findings
aiso indicate that there is a nonneulral scale expansion as factor intensity alters
between small and large farms.
Keywords Aquaculture economics, cost functions, scale economics, substitution
elasticities.
Introduction
The purpose of this study is to analyze economies of scale and substitution possibilities
in the Norwegian fish farming industry in terms of the long-run cost function. The
empirical results of economies of scale is related to the regulation of fish farm size.
The study is primarily motivated by the size issue, because a recent Norwegian
Report to Parliament has called for continued regulation of the industry {Stortingsmeld-
ing No. 65 1986-1987). The government's stated objective (also agreed upon by the fish
farmers' organizations) for regulating farm size is primarily based on equity consider-
ations. By placing a ceiling on fish farm size, thus creating an industry consisting of
many relatively small units, the government wishes to maintain the pattern of scattered
settlement along the coast (Bjorndal and Salvanes 1987). Thus, if economies of scale
exist in the industry, size limitations could lead to a high-cost industry. The topics of
economies of scale and equity and efficiency trade-offs have appeared in traditional
agricultural literature (Bardhan 1973; Khan 1977). This article may then partly be
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looked on as contributing to the issue by testing the equity-efficiency hypothesis for the
Norwegian aquaculture industry.
The sources of increasing retums to scale are twofold: (1) specialization and (2) the
existence of indivisibilities. Specialization advantages arise under increasing scale be-
cause of better organization through the division of labor and tbe use of specialized
equipment. Indivisibilities imply that (capital) equipment is available in only a few
different sizes or that larger units of equipment prove more economical because their
costs increase at a slower rate than tbeir production capacity. Both tbese sources can be
identified in the fisb farming industry. First, large firms have tbe opportunity to hire
persons witb special skills, e.g.. marine biologists. Second, larger operations make
greater use of specialized equipment for feeding and harvesting. However, a limit on
plant size may also be perceived. The site may be considered a limiting factor wbicb
offers decreasing returns beyond a certain level. Tbis is due, in part, to pollution, wbicb
ultimately restricts the productivity of tbe site. Also, losses resulting from disease may
be greater in a large farm.
Tbe outline of this article is as follows. Tbe next section provides a description of
the industry. In the third section a theoretical model of production is presented with
alternative functional forms for tbe total cost function witbin the translog framework.
Tbe fourth section presents the empirical results, and concluding remarks are given in
the last seetion.
Industry Organization
In tbis section follows a description of the organizational structure of the Norwegian fish
farming industry. This structure in turn has implications for tbe modeling of the industry.
Tbis analysis concentrates on the food-product ing stage of the farming industry. The
Atlantic salmon {salmo salar) has become the preferred species for sea pen farming.
This species both grows larger and commands a higber sale price than the competitive
species, rainbow trout (salmo gardneirii). The production strategy, which has been an
important factor for the commercial success of tbis industry, has been to reduce fresh-
water rearing time and increase seawater rearing time because more rapid growtb is
achieved in seawater than in freshwater. The dominant mode of production is the use of
floating sea pens for farming salmon and trout during sea growth; it is tbis open produc-
tion system we analyze here.
The diagram in Figure I, showing tbe distinct units of production and distribution,
identifies the competitive conditions or market constraints tbe grow-out farmer faces. As
indicated in tbe diagram, each stage of production, i.e.. egg production (broodstock
farms) hatcheries, smolt producers, and sea farms, is specialized. Thus, it is appropriate
to analyze food fish farmers separately. It is also reasonable to assume that food fish
farmers are price-takers in the factor markets, because tbere are approximately 400
grow-out farms (1982-1983).
Furthermore, because we are using cross-sectional data, it may be argued that every
firm faces the same factor prices. However, because of a wide disparity of farms along
the coastline, possibilities for factor price differences exist. Furthermore, within each
region tbere are farms botb in marginal and inframargina! areas. For instance, factors
primarily produced in the southern part of tbe country, such as feed and some capital











Figure 1. Participants in the Norwegian fish farming industry.
addition, it is reasonable to argue for interregional differences in wages because of
separated labor markets.
Licensing was introduced in 1973 that imposed barriers to entry on grow-out farms,
hatcheries, and smolt producers. However, in 1985 the barriers to entry on hatcheries
and smolt producers were relaxed with the exception of certain environmental conditions
that must still be met by entrants. Nonetheless, general licensing regulations for fotxl
farms remained in force. The government argues that limiting entry will lead to a bal-
anced development of the industry. Originally this meant that the government, through
licensing, could adapt the total supply to market demand. Later on the government
argued that balanced development should be applied to growth in the supply of veteri-
nary services, education, and research.
In addition, ownership structure, the regional location of the farms, and farm size
were also controlled. The government desired an owner-operator structure in the indus-
try. Moreover, one firm or person is permitted to hold a majority interest in only one fish
farm, and the Directorate of Fisheries must authorize a second-hand transaction of the
majority interests of a farm. One device used by the government to ensure regional
dispersion of plants is quotas on the licences awarded to each region. Another regulation
device, which is of particular interest to this study, is the regulation of the size of
production units. According to the Fish Farming License Act. it is not the production
itself that is regulated to limit farm size. Instead, the act stipulates a limitation on
production capacity indicated by the volume of water for rearing fish. With the assump-
tion of constant density at which salmon are reared in pens, we can argue that regulating
the volume of water is tantamount to exogenously determining output.'
Specification of the Cost Function for Salmon Farming
This section presents a theoretical model of the structure of production based on the
description of the competitive environment in the preceding section and the underlying
biological production process. Furthermore, a description of the translog cost function is
given with the associated estimation technique.352 K, G. Salvanes
A Production Model
It is assumed that the technology can be represented by a neoclassical production func-
tion, which relates production iy) to the input of production factors, capital {K), labor
(L), feed {f), and smolts (5):
y - {K,L,F',S) (1)
This specification assumes that the production function is strongly separable in
smolts. A characteristic feature of the biology of fish farming, in contrast to fisheries, is
that the reproduction stage is separated from the production process, and thus, smolts
can be used as an input factor. Furthermore, assuming strong separability implies that
the smolt decision is separated from the determination of other inputs. Thus, the smolt
input decision does not affect the elasticities of substitution between the other pairs of
input factors {Bemdt and Christensen 1973). Because of the dominant role of feed and
relative unimportance of other intermediate inputs, material inputs other than feed were
excluded when modeling the structure of production.^
A further comment regarding Eq. (1) highlights our definition of production iy). We
define production as both the actual harvest of the year, i.e., sales, plus the change in
stock from the beginning of the year to the end of the year. We also correct for mortality.
This defmition reflects the dynamic aspects of production in salmon farming based on
the biology of salmon. In a normal year, a Norwegian fanner has three year-classes of
salmon in the pens to maintain continuous production. This implies that a proportion of
saimon is not sold in the given year, but kept for harvesting the following year. Given
this harvesting procedure, production consists both of the quantity slaughtered and the
net change in the stock of the living fish in the pens.
Furthermore., we assume that the behavior of the producer is to minimize the cost of
production given factor prices and output level. The rationale for specifying cost mini-
mization as the appropriate behavioral hypothesis—thus assuming output level as exoge-
nousiy determined—is the argument put forward in the preceding section, i.e., the gov-
emment size limitations.^ The nature of production, e.g., economies of scale and
substitution possibilities, may be studied empirically either by a production function or a
cost function. The concept of duality essentially states that technology can alternatively
be represented by a cost or a production function. Thus, under certain regularity condi-
tions, the production structure in Eq. (1) can alternatively be represented by a cost
function relating total production costs (c) to the level of output (y) and factor prices
(w,)'' (see Varian 1978; Fuss and McFadden 1978). We specify the following cost func-
tion:
c(y\w) •= c{y',Wf.,Wi^,w;) (2)
In accordance with the description of the competitive structure of a grow-out farmer in
(he factor markets, exogenous factor prices are assumed. Furthermore, factor price
differences may occur, because the data set is for individual farms and there is a wide
disparity among farms along the Norwegian coast. The three factor prices in Eq. (2) are
indiced of unit capital (w^). labor (iv^), and feed {w^ price. Total cost (c) is defined as
the expenditure on the three identified factors of production. Output is defmed as the
actual harvest plus the change In the stock of living fish. Some production units produce
both salmon and trout. To correct for this, the production level weighted by prices isStructure of the Norwegian Fish Farming Industry 353
used as an alternative definition of output.' Exact definitions and a short description of
the data set are given in the appendix. In order to indicate the relative importance of the
factors, Tbble 1 provides actual factor-shares.
A few other features which complicate the modeling of the production structure
should be mentioned. Because the fish are reared in open-pen systems in seawater, the
physical attributes of the location affect production. An index of site conditions or a
regional subdivision of our data would correct for variable environmental conditions
(this is discussed in more detail in the subsequent section on regional and biophysical
differences). Unfortunately, our sample is not site-specific; hence, an empirical test for
these factors cannot be undertaken. Furthermore, in considering fish farming more or
less a standardized industry production, we do not explicitly deal with the important
uncertainty issues in this kind of activity. The production is exposed to seasonal changes
in water temperatures, oxygen content, and incidence of disease. We implicitly take this
into account by defming output as net of mortality.
The Translog Framework
For econometric estimation, a specific ftinctional form for c(y; w^,W[^,w^) is necessary.
A translog cost function for the fish farming industry is postulated. This form was ftrst
proposed by Christensen, Jorgensen, and Lau (1973), and expanded to incorporate the
presence of economies of scale varying with size by Christensen and Greene (1976). The
translog cost function is specified as follows:
lncO';w) = a,, + a,,lnj
\nc{r,w) ~ a^ + ayl
+ Ey OilniVj "*" ^ ^' ^> ciijiriw,\nwj+ S, aiinw^ + - E, Ey a.^
+ T,i ay,In>'lnH', (3)
where iJ — K,L,F; c is total cost; y the level of output; and w^ the prices of inputs.
Zellner's iterative seemingly unrelated regression method (SUR) is utilized to esti-
mate a system consisting of the cost function and two of the three cost share equations.
One of the cost share equations is dropped, because the cost shares sum to unity and the
covariance matrix is singular. The results are invariant to which equation is dropped.
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When iterating the Zellner method until convergence, it can be shown that one gets




where Xj is the factor demand function for the input factors, the cost share equations for
the translog case can be derived by logarithmic derivation of the cost function
dine dc w, WfX,
— = — — m,, (•>)
dlnw, oWj c c
miiy;w) - a, + a^^ln>' + Lj a^lnwj (6)
where i,j = K,L,F.
nil is the cost share of the /th factor. We drop the equation for labor and thus have a
system consisting of the equations for the total cost function and the cost share equations
for capital and feed. We make the standard assumption of an additive error structure
when transforming the system to an econometric form to fit the SUR model.
Economic theory provides a minimum number of restrictions on the cost functions
in order to represent a well-behaved technology. The cost function, Eq. (3), which is an
approximation of an arbitrary analytical cost function written as a logarithmic Taylor
series expansion to the second term, is homogeneous of degree one in prices if the
following restrictions on the relationships among the parameters are imposed (Christen-
sen etal. 1973).
E, a, - 1
i:, a,> - 0 (7)
E, a,, - 0 iJ = K,L,F
For the equality of the cross derivatives, we require the symmetry constraint
a,j = a/, Vi ^ j (8)
For symmetry. Eq. (8), and linear homogeneity in prices. Eq. (7), restrictions were
imposed throughout. Additional regularity conditions that must be satisfied are mono-
tonicity and concavity in input prices. Monotonicity. i.e., the requirement that the func-
tion must be an increasing function of the input prices, can be shown to be met if the
fitted cost shares are positive. Concavity, to represent a convex technology, implies that
the Hessian matrix, [d^cldw,dWj\, is negative semidefinite (Binswanger 1974).
In studying characteristics of technology, two main issues are of interest: the substi-
tution possibilities in factor space and the scale effects, i.e., the spatial location of the
isoquants. Empirical implementation of production and cost functions by traditional
forms such as Cobb-Douglas and CES a priori impose restrictions on substitution and
scale possibilities. This means that only a subset of the possible range for factor substitu-
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translog do not constrain the production technology in this sense. Restrictions on the
elasticities can instead be tested statistically by imposing linear restrictions on the param-
eters of the cost function and the share equations.
Now consider the substitution possibilities. Unitary elasticity of substitution can be
tested by the restriction:
a,j = 0, ViJ (9)
The Allen-Uzawa partial elasticity of substitution has the following form for the
translog cost function (Bainswanger 1974):
+ 1 (10)
where a,^ is a combination of parameter estimates (a,y) and factor cost shares (m,). The
Allen-Uzawa measure is evaluated at the means for actual (observed) cost shares
(Binswanger 1974). The elasticity of substitution measure indicates which pair of inputs
is a substitute or a complement. A positive value indicates a substitute and a negative
value indicates a complementary relationship. The own-price elasticity has the following
form:
7},, = a,,/m, + m, - I (1!)
The sign of the own-price elasticity is implied to be negative by economic theory
when cost-minimizing behavior is assumed.
The main ftxrus of our study is to provide information on the scale properties of the
fish farm industry. Thus, we are interested in testing restrictions such as homotheticity
and homogeneity. If the technology is homothetic in the inputs, the scale elasticity will
be independent of the marginal rates of substitution. It implies tbat all isoquants have the
same shape as the unit isoquant. This implies that one is expanding along the scale in a
Hicks neutral manner, i.e.. at a constant factor ratio. The general cost function can then
be written as a separable function in output and factor prices. From Eq. (3) we see that if
a. = 0, W (12)
the translog function can be decomposed in this manner, and Eq. (12) is then the restric-
tion to be tested for homotheticity.
The technology is homogenous in all inputs if the returns to scale are independent of
the output level. Homogeneity requires then that the following restrictions are imposed
in terms of Eq. (3):
a,,,- - 0, vi, a,,, = 0 (13)
Given our aim to analyze scale properties, the following three models will be con-
sidered:
Model I. No restrictions implied, i.e.. a complete translog function. In terms of econo-
mies of scale we now have a nonhomothetic function.
Model II. Restrictions on retums to scale to a homothetic function {ay, — 0, Vf).T
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Mode! III. Restrictions on returns to scale to a homogeneous function (a,,, = 0, vi,
a,y = 0).
The respective formulae for the elasticity of scale of the three models as defined by
the relationship between total cost and output along the expansion path are (Hanoch
1975):
Model I.







where i = K,L,F.
We notice that the models from III to I increase in order of complexity. The homoge-
neous function may indicate economies of scale if it is greater than one. Model II is more
interesting in this respect, because we are able to show the possible variation in the scale
elasticity with respect to the size of the farms and to detect whether economies of scale
are exhausted, i.e., if e(.v) approaches unity, within our sample. Model I permits us to
test whether the expansion in scale is non-neutral. This implies that input ratios are
dependent on the level of output. A priori we expect a better fit to the underlying data
the more flexible the models. Furthermore, the additional information gained by defin-
ing output levels in value terms may provide a better specification.
Empirical Results
The estimated parameters of the three models are shown in Table 2. To ensure that the
condition for duality is satisfied, the symmetry constraints in Eq. (8) and homogeneity
constrains in Eq. (7) can be tested by performing likelihood ratio tests. However, we
could not invert the data matrix for the complete unconstrained model, and hence could
not test the symmetry condition. Multicollinearity among right-side variables—all de-
fined as combinations of factor prices either in logarithms of single factor prices of the
first and second term, cross prices, or output and prices—precluded an inverse of the
matrix. However, we tested homogeneity of degree one against the model with symme-
try imposed. The hypotheses that the cost function is homogeneous of degree one in
prices was not rejected (the likelihood ratio is 5.59 and the critical x" value is 9.2 at the
1% level). Hence, we imposed the homogeneity and symmetry restrictions on the cost
model for further testing.''
Monotonicity and convexity must be tested on the estimated functions. The pre-
dicted share equations were positive at every observation point, i.e., the monotonicity
condition is satisfied. The Hessian matrix was negative semidefinite at the point of
expansion of the translog cost functions; hence, convex technology was secured. The
parameter estimates reported in Table 2 for Model 1 and Model II needed six iterationsStructure of the Norwegian Fish Farming Industry 357
Table 2
Cost Function Parameter Estimates Based







































































































































Notes, /-ratios (asymptotic) are given in parenthesis. R^ is the multiple correlation coefficient
for the cost function equation corrected for the degrees of freedom.
for convergence. About 80% or more of the parameter estimates in the different model
specifications were significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level.
Many farms produce both salmon and trout. Hence, on a priori grounds we prefer to
define the level of output in value terms, correcting for that fact. We present the results
for the cost function where output is defined in physical units in Model I.I and in value
terms in Model I. The results are very similar; however, Model I provides a slightly
better performance, because the R' has risen to 0.93.358 K. G. Salvanes
This improved fit for Model I, and also the fact that it provides a higher scale
elasticity, may indicate the presence of economies of scope, i.e., the ability of firms
producing two or more products to pool inputs and produce more efficiently. However,
some of the firms produce only salmon and others only trout. If the tendency to produce
only one of these species is correlated with size, it may also give the above result given
differences in the cost of producing these two species.'
Likelihood ratio tests were performed on the different restrictions. Since minus
twice the logarithm of the likelihood ratio—the ratio of the maximum of the likelihood
function under the null hypothesis to the maximum of the likelihood function under the
altemative hypothesis—is asymptotically chi-square distributed, one can perform signifi-
cance tests. The number of degrees of freedom is equal to the restrictions imposed by the
null hypothesis (Theil 1971). Table 3 reports the likelihood ratio statistics for the hypoth-
esis of homogeneity and homotheticity for Models I and I.I. In addition, we tested the
hypothesis of unitary elasticity of substitution.
Table 3 (column 3) indicates that the null hypothesis of unitary elasticity of substitu-
tion is rejected at the 1 % level. That is, there are substitution possibilities beyond those
implied by a Cobb-Douglas technology in fish farming at the firm level, and modeling
the production structure should allow these possibilities. The estimated chi-square values
corresponding to the null hypothesis of homogeneity and homotheticity are both signifi-
cant, and hence the null hypotheses are rejected for Model I.I and Model I. From these
tests it can be concluded that a nonhomothetic and thus nonhomogenous cost function
corresponds best to the production structure for Norwegian salmon farming.
A Chow test was utilized in testing the structural stability over the sample period,
i.e.. between 1982 and 1983. The calculated F-statistics (F — 0.42) indicate that the null
hypothesis of structural difference can be rejected. (The critical value is F = 2.04 for
V| = 15 and v^ = 171 degrees of freedom at the 95% confidence level.) This implies
that the structure of production is stable over the sample period.
Factor Demand Properties
Table 4 reports estimates of factor demand with respect to own-price. The mean values
of the actual shares in the industry are used in computing the measures defined by Eq.
(II).
The demand elasticities have the correct sign suggested a priori from economic
theory. However, the absolute values are less than one. implying that the farmers are
relatively insensitive with respect to price changes. This is particularly true for the feed
input, indicating a very stable feeding pattern.
Table 3
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Table 4
Estimated Demand Elasticities Based
on Translog Cost Function
Capital Labor Feed
Elasticity
of factor demand -0.456 -0.318 -0.227
Note. Elasticities have been calculated at mean values of the actual shares.
In Table 5 the.point estimates for the Allen-Uzawa elasticities of substitution are
shown. They have been calculated by employing Eq. (10). The confidence intervals
were derived from Anderson and Thursby's (1986) study.^
Table 5 shows that capital-labor and capital-feed are substitutes. In genera! we
would expect a priori capital and labor to be substitutes. To be specific, if the relative
price of automatic feeders dropped compared with labor, it should be possible for a
farmer to employ a higher proportion of automatic feeders. On the other band, because
the living stock of fish is defined as a part of tbe capital measure as noted in the
appendix, there may be a built-in tendency for labor and capital to behave as comple-
ments, tbat is, the more capital (in terms of living stock of fish), the more labor.
However, the results indicate that capital and labor are substitutes. Because it can be
argued that automatic feeders allow conservation, one would expect capital and feed to
be substitutes a priori. There are two arguments that may modify this assumption.
First, the argument of the living stock of fish applies for the relationship between
capital and feed also. Second, although farm managers indicate that automatic feeders
conserve both feed and labor, it is not obvious; feeding by hand may be more efficient.
The results of the cost function estimation support a substitutions relationship between
capital and feed. Given that automatic feeders could save both labor and feed for the
farmer, one would expect labor and feed to be complements and not substitutes as
indicated by tbe estimated value in Table 5. However, discussion above implies tbat
this assumption does not hold, and the labor-feed relationship is hard to predict.
Hence, from the confidence interval (in Table 5) around the point estimate for labor-
feed, we see that both substitution and complementary properties exist in this range. In
addition to the arguments given above, one rationale for this result is that one method
Point Estimates and Confidence Intervals

















Note. Elasticities have been calculated from mean actual cost shares.360 K. G. Salvanes
of husbandry in the industry has not yet been established and different techniques and
combinations of methods for feeding are still utilized. Automatic feeding combined
with complementary hand feeding might be one metbod of husbandry reflected by the
results given in Table 5.
Scale Properties
Nonhomogeneity. In order to investigate the scale properties in more detail, Figure 2
shows Models I and II using output defined in value terms.
Tbe estimated values for model III, i.e., the homogeneous case, show significant
increasing returns to scale, with e = 1.18. When scale is allowed to vary in Models I
and II with output, more interesting results appear.
A convenient way of summarizing the scale properties found in the three model
specifications is to graph the returns to scale functions for the models. The scale elastic-
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Figure 2. The retums-to-scale function for Models I. II. and III. and the size distribution of firms
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Model I.'
tiCy) - K + a^jJn^ + S, a^ilnw,)"'
- (0.407 + 0.0541n>' + 2, a^,lnWi)"'
Model II.
^2^) - iciy + a,^nyy' = (0.177 + 0.047ln>')"'
Model in. /
cj - iayY' - (0.848)"' = 1.18
where / — K,L,F.
Figure 2 shows that the scale elasticity for the homogeneous case, i.e.. Model III—
which can be interpreted as the average level of scale elasticity—hides the variation in
returns to scale over the sample of firms. We also notice that Models I and U, which
allow for variations in scale, graph almost the same curve for economies of scale. These
results appear to confirm our a priori expectations of first increasing returns to scale
followed by a portion of the curve, whicb is flat, approaches e(y) •= 1, and does not
exhibit statistically significant returns to scale. Wbere tbe scale elasticity has the size of
€ — 1.07, we can no longer reject the null bypotbesis of constant returns to scale {t —
2.10) at the 95% confidence level with a two-tail test. Hence, the flat portion of tbe
curve indicates tbat the economies of scale in the Norwegian fisb farming industry are
exhausted within tbe range of our sample. However, we are not able to detect any dis-
economies of scale—where the scale elasticity is below 1.
To illustrate the potential of unexploited economies of scale, we present the size
distribution of firms in 1983 beneath tbe returns to scale curves. This comparison re-
veals tbat a large portion of tbe plants operate in the size interval where the returns to
scale are significantly greater than one. Hence, gains from expanding the firm size as
interpreted by lower average production costs exist. However, our results also indicate a
limit to tbese gains, because the flat portion of the curve indicates constant returns to
scale within tbe range of our sample size. Although data is not available to test the effect
of location, the site is probably the restricting factor leading to constant returns to scale
for tbe largest farms. Tbis is discussed further below.
Nonhomotheticity. Tbe nonhomotbeticity bypothesis is supported by tbe test statistics
found in Table 3, This means that for given factor price ratios, an increase in output
changes tbe ratio of factor inputs (or factor sbares). Hence, there is a non-neutral expan-
sion along tbe scale, implying differences in relative factor intensities between small and
large firms. Tbis result under the complete translog provides a great deal of information
on tbe structure of the salmon farming industry in Norway and has a strong, intuitive
economic appeal.
Two hypotheses are advanced to explain tbe nonhomotbetic property. First,, simply
stated, the nature of the tecbnology yields nonbomotheticity. That is, due to indivisibil-
ities in capital and higb fixed costs in using specialized equipment for barvesting and
feeding, some processes are only available to firms with bigb production and tbus
yield rising capital intensity witb volume. An indication of this is seen in Table 6.
The inputs of capital and labor are measured as annual costs, as defined in tbe362 K. G. Salvanes
Table 6
Capital-Labor Ratio for Size
Distribution of Farms
Average of the 10 Average of the 10
Largest Farms Mean Farm Smallest Farms
1.28 0.84 0.57
Appendix. Table 6 indicates a difference in the relative use of inputs, indicating nonho-
motheticity; i.e., the capital-labor ratio is higher for large firms.
Another, more interesting explanation is the po.ssible relationship between tbe cur-
rent measured nonhomotheticity and the difference in relative factor prices for large and
small firms when they were established.'" That is. the difference in the relative factor
intensities—nonhomotheticity—may also be explained by a change in relative factor
prices facing firms that allowed substitution. And. most important, this substitution
allowed non-neutral expansion along the scale. Because we use cross-sectional data, the
only source of variation in relative prices is separated factor markets. Tberefore, to
explain tbe difference in relative factor priees, one must investigate the institutional
framework of Norwegian salmon farming.
Imperfections in factor markets in this industry exist in tbe labor market and in tbe
market—or nonexistence of market—for production capacity, defmed as water for rear-
ing salmon. The second imperfection is due to the regulation of size.
The imperfection in the labor market takes the form of a dual lahor market. Smaller
firms are family-based production units where family members work for a wage lower
than the market rate. Larger fish farm must hire labor in the ordinary labor market.
Hence, bigger firms face a higher relative price for labor and may substitute capital,
e.g.. automatic feeding, alarm systems, and equipment for barvesting. for labor wben
expanding. Thus the factor price disparities necessary to allow for substitution appear as
nonhomotheticity in our model.
Tbe argument for the relative lack of production capacity for small farms compared
with bigger farms due to regulations points in the same direction. It is intuitively reason-
able to argue that small farms being restricted in production capacity in terms of regu-
lated pen volume tend to use more inputs, which they are free to hire—for instance,
labor."
This finding that small fish farms use variable factors (particularly labor) more
intensively than bigger farms is also an important characteristic of the traditional agricul-
tural sector in developing countries (Khan 1977). In that case, land is the scarce factor
for small farms, and farmers compensate by using fertilizer and labor. The similarity is
obvious, and the scarce factor for small fish farms is production capacity, defined as pen
volume. This similarity points to the generality of our results.
Short-Run and Long-Run Adjustment. In tbis section we analyze further the small firms'
relative lack of production capacity in terms of pen volume and discuss a possible bias in
the long-run scale elasticity measure. The origins of the bias may be stated as follows. It
is arguable that there is no long-run cost curve as an envelope to short-run curves due to
pen volume limits that vary according to the licencing date. In other words, given a
volume constraint, individual farms will adjust along their short-run cost curves as theyStructure of the Norwegian Fish Farming Industry
expand their quantity of production. Firms will continue this expansion along their short-
run cost curves until each size group equalizes its marginal cost and marginal revenue.
This is illustrated in Figure 3.
Given plant size, firms adjust along the denoted arrow portions of short-run curves
(SAC). Different curves appear for each subgroup according to different given pen
volumes. Thus, when estimating the long-run cost curve (LAC), we actually fit a line
that lies entirely above the LAC curve for the plants smaller than the minimum of the
long-run average cost in Y'. Hence, to the extent that firms in scales 1-4 operate on the
right side of the tangency points of the SAC curves, one gets a steeper average cost
curve, thus overestimating the scale effect. The scale elasticity has an upward bias, and
the scale economies are overestimated.
As long as some input is not infinitely divisible, we will in every industry have
firms adjusting along their short-run curves. However, unless they are regulated in the
use of one factor, as in this case, firms will switch from one short-run curve to another
where the short-run curves intersect. In this particular case the farms might adjust even
beyond the switching points (intersections of the SAC curves), because the use of pen
volume is restricted. The extent to which this happens would be measurable if we had
data to calculate the short-run cost curves for each size group in pen volume or produc-
tion level. However, one indication that firms actually adjust beyond the switching
points is that they have a high-capacity utilization mea.sured in percentage use of licensed
pen volume; 94 and 98.5% for the 1982 and 1983 samples, respectively.
The explanation given above of the fish farms* adjustment when the pen size is
restricted points to a different interpretation of the difference in average cost between
small and large farms. Some of the difference in cost efficiency is due to economies of
scale as interpreted in the concept of scale elasticity. However, in our case some of the
difference in production costs between small and large farms is also due to regulation of
pen volume as an input factor. The regulation of pen volume causes the restricted farms
to adjust along their short-run cost curves instead of along the most cost-efficient long-
run cost curve. Hence, our result concerning increasing returns to scale, which is an
overestimate of the pure measure economies of scale, is probably a result of the com-
bined effects of size regulation of the industry and of economies of scale. However, the
form of the data set precludes separating the different aspects of cost difference due to
scale. Furthermore, this discussion on the possible effect of size regulation also indicates
an alternative short-run cost function specification when regulated water volume is a
given factor.
The next question to pose is: How important is this bias? In an earlier work, using
only the 1982 data set, capacity data were available. Thus, a Cobb-Douglas cost function
was estimated introducing the capacity restriction in two different ways (Salvanes 1985).
First, segments of the long-run cost function were estimated by splitting the sample into
subsamples according to regulated volume constraints. Then a restricted short-run cost
function was estimated utilizing size capacity as a given factor. From this specification
one was able to derive and test the long-^run elasticity of scale measure, because the
simple Cobb-Douglas functional form was used. In both cases, results were obtained that
could not be significantly distinguished from an unrestricted Cobb-Douglas cost function
(Salvanes 1985). This comparison of the restricted and unrestricted results from differ-
ent specified cost functions should not be taken as proof of the insignificance of the bias,
because two different models are being contrasted. However, it gives an indication of the





Figure 3. Possible estimation bias in the long-run cost function.
Regional and Biophysical Differences
As mentioned, no data are available on the geographic dispersion or site characteristics
of farms, i.e., environmental parameters. However, farm location in hoth respects
probably has an impact on the economic performance of the farms. Because it is
impossible to test, in this case the possible effects of farm location are discussed on a
qualitative level. The possible effects of the salmon/trout stock composition and the
ownership structure on economies of scale in both large and small firms also are
discussed.
The difference between the northern and southern coastal areas in Norway reflect
the distinction between peripheral and central areas. The three northern counties. Fin-
mark, Troms. and Nordland, constitute peripheral areas. Peripheral areas also exist in
southern Norway, both along the Qords and on the coast. Table A in the appendix shows
the distribution of farms and indicates that both large and small farms are located in all
regions along the coast. Thus there should be no bias in the elasticity of scale measure in
terms of a locational effect. In other words, neither large nor small farms seem to be
over represented in any region. Furthermore, biophysical factors vary both from north to
south and from east to west (from sites further inland on a Qord and those out on the
coast). Average seawater temperatures are lower in the north than in the south, and
salinity is presumably higher on the coast than inland, whereas oxygen content is pre-
sumably lower. Water temperatures may be too high periodically in southern areas,
leading to decreased oxygen concentrations and in tum increased mortality. All of theseStructure of the Norwegian Fish Farming Industry 365
factors prevent the creation of a systematic characterization of large and small farms
according to regional and biophysical characteristics.
Different environmental features that influence feed conversion efficiency and
mortality rates do not necessarily vary systematically. The complex nature of regional
and environmental effects, both north-south and east-west, is illustrated by the profit-
ability ranking conducted by the Directorate of Fisheries (Lonsemdundersakingar
1982. 1983).
Table 7 shows that the ranking in profitability according to region is not from south
(region IV) to north (region I). However, the results indicate that regional and environ-
mental factors are important in explaining the performance of fish farms. In addition,
one should try to separate the effects of regional and environmental characteristics and
be careful when specifying the different biophysical factors, because they are not neces-
sarily highly correlated. Dummy variables can be used to test the impact on fish farming
of regional/environmental factors. However, due to the complexity of the different fac-
tors, many dummy variables have to be specified in our case. Tbus a site index weigbt-
ing the different biophysical characteristics properly (also including regional differences)
and specifying it as a fixed factor in the cost function is probably the most favorable
alternative. One would gain information on the degree to which the site limits tbe
farmer, and it sbould be possible to identify different optimal farm sizes depending on
tbe suitability of the site for salmon aquaculture. Tbis will be an important extension of
this article and will probably modify our present results, but data limitations have pre-
vented it so far.
In conclusion, there are two additional factors that may modify the results concern-
ing relative cost efficiency between small and large firms. As stated in note 5, farms that
produce salmon are more profitable than farms which produce trout. This fact may
partially explain the differences in costs if trout constitute a larger share of the stock iti
small farms than in large farms. However, evidence indicates the opposite—rainbow
trout constitute a larger share of the stock in large farms. Tbis distinction is a result of
the fact that older farms have a larger proportion of rainbow trout, because It was the
first salmonid to be cultured. Older farms also tend to be larger, because tbey were
established prior to the introduction of tbe Licence Act. Data limitations prevent a
formal test of this tendency.









of Profitability in Norwegian Fish


















Source: Directorate of Fisheries.366 K. G. Salvanes
opposite effect. Most farms in Norway are owner-operated due to public regulation;
however, there is a tendency in peripheral areas and possibly small farms toward an
intensive use of family labor. Because the wage rate is measured as the rate paid for
hired labor, the cost of small farms may be overestimated. However, the unavailability
of ownership data prevents further investigation of this effect.
Concluding Remarks
The dual objectives of this article were to provide a model for the structure of the
Norwegian salmon and trout farming industry and to provide estimates for the scale
elasticity and substitution possibilities. In the representation of the primary mode of
production, two main features were emphasized. First, it was argued that juvenile pro-
duction could be a separate activity. This feature is unique for fish farming as opposed to
commercial fisheries and enables a separate analysis of the food fish segment of the
aquaculture industry. Second, it was argued that a farmer produces one complete year-
class in a normal year. However, harvest quantities may vary from year to year. By
defming actual production as actual harvest plus the change in the stock in pens, one
achieves a measure of annual production equal to a year-class. Thus the dynamic optimi-
zation problem may be reasonably approximated by a static cost function. This realistic
simplification was necessary because the data set is presented in calendar years.
The results were satisfactory in terms of two criteria, i.e., a high multiple correla-
tion coefficient and r-statistics. Furthermore, duality properties of linear homogeneity in
prices, monotonicity. and convexity were satisfied. The symmetry property could not be
tested without prior restrictions on the functions.
The empirical results of paramount importance regarding scale properties can be
summarized by the following three points.
(1) Economies of scale existed in the industry about 1982-1983 in the sense that the
homogeneous version of the cost function showed statistically significant increasing
returns to scale. This implies that there were potential benefits from increasing
output. However, estimates of a nonhomogeneous cost function indicate that the
higgest plants within our sample had exhausted their economies of scale. However,
we note that our measure of the cost efficiency of large farms compared with small
farms probably incorporates the combined effect of regulation and economies of
scale.
(2) The fmdings also indicate that there was a non-neutral scale expansion as factor
intensity altered between small and large plants. The result arose under the nonho-
mothetic cost function.
(3) Both regional differences and biophysical characteristics have an impact on the eco-
nomic performance. Due to data limitations we could not test this, only indicate the
effects and give an outline of a procedure to test it empirically. The effect of owner-
ship and composition of salmon and trout stocks in farms also indicate that the
results should be interpreted with some care.
With respect to the behavior of input demand, two major results can be highlighted:
(1) The own-price elasticities for input demand all obtained the correct sign, i.e., nonin-
creasing in own price, which confirms rational behavior.
(2) Both capital-labor and capital-feed input combinations were found to be substitutes.
The labor-feed relationship was, however, ambiguous: the function specificationStructure of the Norwegian Fish Farming Industry 367
yielded a relationship indicating that these inputs could be both complements and
substitutes.
These conclusions on scale properties may have dynamic implications for the Nor-
wegian fanning industry. To date, Norwegian salmon farms have been very profitable as
a partial consequence of high prices. However, this picture will probably change in the
next few years. Above-normal profits were initially possible with limited output and
high prices. As a consequence of this high profitability, other countries are expanding or
planning to invest in this industry. Downward pressure on price is inevitable given the
demand elasticities found in recent research (DeVbretz and Salvanes 1988; Lin and
Herrmann 1988; Kabir and Ridler 1984). Thus, size restrictions, which seem to preclude
exploiting scale advantages, although desirable for the rural economy, may restrain the
further expansion of the most cost-efficient segment of the industry in Norway.
It is difficult to evaluate tbe future strength of this rent dissipation effect. A data set
more recent than the 1982-1983 set currently available is necessary, because costs may
have changed by now and one would expect the relative factor prices to have changed
also. The price of smolts, for example, has dropped relative to other input prices.
Furthermore, location is probably the limiting factor in production which ultimately
gives decreasing returns, and differences with respect to this factor may cause different
cost structures among complete data set, location should be included either via cross-
classification in the sample or directly in the production function as an index variable. In
addition, to achieve a better model specification, different cost function formulations,
especially with regulated capacity in pen volume, should be an area for further research.
Appendix
We have utilized primary data for food fish farms from 91 individual plants (the whole
population consisted of 328 operations) for 1982, and from 116 farms in 1983 (the
population was then 362). The data base was received from the Norwegian Directorate
of Fisheries and is identical with the data used in its publication on the profitability of
Norwegian grow-out farms (Lonsemdundersokingar for fiskeoppdrettsanlegg 1982,
1983). Farms below 500 m^ in pen volume were excluded by the Directorate of Fish-
eries. Table 8 shows the dispersion in the sample according to region and size.
Table 8 indicates that farms in all size groups have been included, from the north-
ernmost regions (I). Finnmark, Troms and Nordland, to the southwest regions (IV) of
Rogaland and Skagerak. The samples include observations above the contemporary pre-
vailing upper size limit, because these farms were established before 1973 when the
preliminary Licence Act was enacted. Thus, we can test for economies of scale for the
relevant output range. On the other hand, there are relatively few observations above
this upper limit. The lack of data on environmental characteristics also limited the range
of testable alternative cross-classifications. Table 9 provides summary statistics of the
variables used.
The following variable definitions were used (all variables are inflated to 1983
values by a general price index from the Norwegian Central Bureau of Statistics {Statisti-
cal Yearbook 1985)).
Output is defmed as an index of production of salmon and trout in tonnes consisting
of tonnes harvested and the change in stock of living fish. The change in stock is the
difference between the stock of living fish as of December 31, 1982, and as of Decem-
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the different year-classes. The alternative output definition in value terms is defined as
the sum of sales and the change in stock evaluated at 70% of the sale price, which is the
anticipated cost (Lonsemdundersekingar 1982, 12).
The unit capital price was calculated as an index of the capital flow of the different
capital items divided by total capital. The flow of services was calculated as a user type
including depreciation based on replacement cost and current interest rates. Depreciation
data was provided by the Directorate of Fisheries and was calculated by dividing the
various subgroups according to the expected economic life of the capital. The second
part of the user cost of capital was calculated as 7 % of total capital annually. The interest
rate was set at 7%, because this figure represents the discount rate for public investments
in Norway. Total capital is defmed as the value of the capital investment in a plant for a
specific year. Figures for total capital were also provided by the Directorate of Fisheries.
The stock value has also been included in the figures for total value, because fish are
linked to a farm over a period of time in the same manner as capital equipment. An
alternative approach would be to designate the stock as a separate factor of production.
However, inadequate data made this alternative impossible. The Directorate of Fisheries
calculated the value by multiplying the number of fish in each size group by the corre-
sponding weight at the end of the year and evaluated it at 70% of sales prices, i.e., the
anticipated cost price. The Directorate of Fisheries used 70% and not 100% of the sales
value in evaluating the fish in pens because 70% was considered to be the alternative
value of the fish in water, i.e., the fish were not considered ready for the market.
However, it can be argued that one should evaluate change in living fish in the pens at
market prices.
The unit capital price was calculated as the capital flow divided by the total capital.
By defining the price of capital in this way using total capital, we could run into multi-
collinearity problems, because output (including change of living fish) and capital price
(total capital includes stock of living fish) and capital price (total capital includes stock of
living fish) could be highly correlated (the correlation coefficient between output and
capital price in this case is 0.56). One cause for such an efficiency shift in the conversion
ratio could be introduction of new feeding equipment in the period. A variable informa-
tion does not indicate that this happened. Furthermore, a change in the density of fish of370 K. G. Sahanes
15% (from 14 kg/m in 1983) could cause an efficiency shift in the conversion ratio, but
we do not think it is important enough to cause a structural shift between 1982 and 1983
(Lensemdundersokinger for fiskeoppdrettsanlegg 1982, 1983).
The labor price index was calculated as the annual expenses on hired labor divided
by the hours of work. Labor expenses were calculated as the labor payment for hired
labor plus the imputs value of self-employed and unpaid family labor, assuming the same
wage rate as for employed worker.
Feed price annual expenses were included in the data set (corrected for inventory
changes). The figures for quantities bought, however, were not available. The index of
feed price is therefore defined as expenditure on feed divided by output. This defini-
tion is possible because the relationship between output (fish growth) and the quantity
of feed is evident in a conversion ratio of kg feed to kg fish produced. This calculation
must be considered a proxy for the real feed price. Of course, there may be distur-
bances in the relationship between the amount of feed used and the quantity produced,
because the conversion ratio may vary according to biophysical site characteristics
such as oxygen content, salinity, temperature, etc. As discussed in the section on
regional and biophysical differences, it is difficult to see a systematic picture of error
because different site parameters do not necessarily correlate and both small and large
farms are found in all regions along the coast. Furthermore, there may be a shift in
feed conversion efficiency between 1982 and 1983 that will be picked up by our
replacement for feed price instead of a change in the parameters. One cause for such
an efficiency shift in the conversion ratio could be an introduction of new feeding
equipment in the period. Available information does not indicate that this happened.
Furthermore, a change in the density of fish of 15% (from 14 kg/m' in 1982 to 16 kg/
m in 1983) could cause an efficiency shift in the conversion ratio, but we do not find
this important enough to cause a structural shift between 1982 and 1983 (L0nsemdun-
dersokingar for fiskoppdrettsanlegg 1982, 1983).
Total costs are. in accordance with the above definitions, the expenditures on the
identified variables, capital, labor, and feed.
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Notes
1. On the other hand, with variations in fish density among farms, there is not a one-to-one
relationship between production and capacity. Over time, the density of fish held in pens has
increased. Still, it could be argued that there is a one-to-one relationship between volume of water
and out-put for one or two years, in this case, 1982 and 1983. The dispersion of production levels
should then be due to different levels of production capacity given by the regulating authorities
that have varied over time. Comparing the density (production in kilo per cubic meter across size
groups is inconclusive. The average within the groups also seems to be equal across groups,
except for the group consisting of the biggest farms.
2. Because of inadequate data on quantities of the other material inputs, we could not develop
an index consisting of ail the intermediate inputs.Structure of the Norwegian Fish Farming Industry 371
3. However, the dynamic characteristics of production, in which the farmer can decide on the
optimal harvest of a year-class, opens the possibility of using a profit function to represent the
farmer's decisionmaking problem; i.e., output is an endogenous decision variable. Perhaps profit
maximizing is the most general formulation in this respect; on the other hand. Norwegian pro-
ducers appear to have standardized procedures for the time to harvest each year-class, implying
that cost-minimizing is also an appropriate behavioral hypothesis. A profit-function approach is
analyzed in Salvanes (1988).
4. From Varian (1978), the cost functions c(y,w) must satisfy the following properties to
ensure duality with the production function: (1) nondecreasing in w (monotonicity); (2) homoge-
neous of degree 1 in w; (3) concave in w, where w is ihe vector of factor prices.
5. Due to a lack of farms producing both salmon and trout, estimating a joint function was
ruled out. Testing a hypothesis of economies of scope—the possible advantage of producing more
than one product—was impossible due to this lack of data.
6. It is not unusual for problems to arise in testing some of the duality properties. The reason
may be difficulties in inverting the data matrix, as in our case, or too few degrees of freedom to
estimate the unconstrained model (Weaver 1983; Binswanger 1974). Because these properties
must be assumed for a well-defined technology—and translog cost function is an approximation to
the true function and thus docs not necessarily globally satisfy these properties—one has to impose
them for further testing (Weaver 1983).
7. The Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries was able to undertake study of separate farms
producing only one species by comparing cost averages between the subgroups. It turned out that
salmon was the most profitable (Lonsemdundersekinger 1982).
8. Using Monte Carlo experiments, Anderson and Thursby (1986) evaluated properties of
elasticity estimators with different assumptions of factor cost shares with different assumptions of
the cost shares and distributions. Their examination of empirical results suggests that inferences
regarding values of substitution elasticities cannot be derived from point estimates alone; the
proper confidence intervals that they define contain both negative and positive values of the
elasticities. Hence, the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval may give conflicting
information regarding whether factors are substitutes (positive values) or complements (negative
values). We utilized formulas developed in Anderson and Thursby (1986) when deriving confi-
dence intervals.
9. We used the mean values of the factor prices in calculating the scale variation dependent on
output for Model I. It may be interpreted as the returns-to-scale function for the mean firm.
10. Josin and Faircbild (1984) used historical changing factor price ratios leading to a bias in
technological development, to account for a measured nonhomotheticity in an industry. To test a
hypothesis like that in our case, we would need time-series data. Because the Norwegian fish
farming industry has developed during the last few years, there was probably very little technolog-
ical change until 1982/1983. Hence, in our case this is probably not significant in explaining the
current nonbomotheticity.
11. Possible imperfections in the capital market may also partly explain nonhomotheticity in
the industry. The possible imperfection in the capital market could be due to a screening process
undertaken by the banks when providing loans to farms. For instance, one could argue that large
farms could more easily obtain loans from banks because they are considered more reliable
customers than smaller farms. However, such an argument, if true, does not necessarily indicate
that large farms should be more capital-intensive than small farms. This type of screening process
would instead support the argument that large farms could more easily expand in general by
financing their demand for all factors. Furthermore, in the period for which we have data, 1982-
1983, there were apparently few restrictions on financing fish farms in Norway.
References
Anderson. R. G., and J. G. Thursby. Confidence intervals for elasticity estimators in translog
models. Review of Economics and Statistics 68:647-656.i72 K. G. Salvanes
Bardhan, P. K. 1973. Size, productivity and returns to scale: An analysis of farm-level data in
Indian agriculture. Journal of Political Economy 18(2):463-476.
Berndt. E. R.. and L. R. Christensen. 1973. The internal structure of functional relationships:
Separability, substitution, and aggregation. Review of Economics Studies 403-410.
Binswanger. H. P. (1974). A cost function approach to the measurement of elasticities of factor
demand and elasticities of substitution. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 56:377-
386.
Bjerndal. T, and K. G. Salvanes. 1987. Offentleg regulering av naeringa (Public regulation of the
industry), in Bjerndal, et al.. Eiskeoppdretts-akonomi (Eish farming management). Oslo:
Cappelen.
Christensen. L. R.. and W. H. Greene. 1976. Economics of scale in U.S. electric power genera-
tion. Journal of Political Economy 84:655-676.
Christensen, L. R., D. W. Jorgensen. and L. J. Lau. 1973. Transcendental logarithmic production
frontiers. Review of Economics and Statistics 55:28-45.
DeVoretz. D. J.. and K. G. Salvanes. 1988. Demand for Norwegian farmed salmon: A market
penetration model. In Proceedings of the Second Conference of International Institute of
Fisheries Economics and Trade.
Fuss, M., and D. McFadden. Production economics: A dual approach to theory and applications.
Vol. 1. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Hanoch. G. 1975. The elasticity of scale and the shape of the average costs. American Economic
Review 65(3): 492-497.
Josin. K.. and L. G. Fairchild. Non-homotethicity and technological bias in production. Review of
Economics and Statistics 66(1):452-471.
Kabir. M.. and N. B. RIdler. 1984, The demand for Atlantic salmon in Canada. Canadian Journal
of Agricultural Economics 32:560-568.
Khan, M. H. 1977. Land productivity, farm size and returns to scale in Pakistan agriculture.
World Development 5:317-323.
Kmenta. J. 1986. Elements of Econometrics. 2d ed. New York: MacMillan.
Lin, B.-H., and M. Herrmann. 1988. An economic analysis of Atlantic salmon markets. Depart-
ment of Agricultural Economics. University of Idaho.
Lensemdundersokingar for fiskeoppdrettsanlegg 1982. Rapporter og Meldinger No. 8 84. Fiskeri-
direktoratet (Directorate of Fisheries).
Lonsemdundersokinger for Fiskeoppdrettsanlegg 1983. Rapporter og Meldinger No. 8 85.
Fiskeridirektoratet (Directorate of Fisheries).
Magnus. J. R. 1978. Maximum likelihood estimation of the GLS model with unknown parameters
in the disturbance covariance matrix. Journal of Econometrics 7:281-312.
Nerlove. M. 1963. Returns to scale in electric supply. In Measurement in economics, ed. F
Christ. Stanford: Standford University Press.
Salvanes, K. G. 1985, Fiskeoppdrett og offentleg regulering. Ein empirisk analyse av norsk
matfiskoppdrett (Public regulation offish farming. An empirical analysis for Norwegian fish
farms). Center for Applied Research. Norwegian School of Economics and Business Admin-
istration.
Salvanes, K. G. 1988. Salmon aquaculture in Norway: An empirical analysis of cost and produc-
tion properties. Ph.D. diss.. Institute of Fisheries Economics, Norwegian School of Eco-
nomics and Business Administration.
Statistical yearbook. 1985. Norwegian Central Bureau of Statistics.
Stortingsmelding (Report to Parliament) No. 65, 1986-1987. Om havbnik (On fishfarming).
Oslo: Norwegian Parliament.Structure of the Norwegian Fish Farming Industry 373
Thiel, H. 1971. Principles of econometrics. New York: Wiley.
Varian, H. R. 1978. Microeconomic analysis. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
Weaver, R. D. 1983. Multiple input, multiple output choices and technology in the U.S. wheat
region. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 65:45-56.
White. K. J. 1987. A general computer program for econometric methods—SHAZAM. Econo-
metrica 46:239-240.